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Source privacy plays a key role in communication infrastructure protection. It is a critical security requirement for many mission
critical communications. This is especially true for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) due to node mobility and lack of physical
protection. Existing cryptosystem-based techniques and broadcasting-based techniques cannot be easily adapted to MANET
because of their extensive cryptographic computation and/or large communication overhead. In this paper, we first propose a
novel unconditionally secure source anonymous message authentication scheme (SAMAS). This scheme enables message sender
to transmit messages without relying on any trusted third parties. While providing source privacy, the proposed scheme can
also provide message content authenticity. We then propose a novel communication protocol for MANET that can ensure
communication privacy for both message sender and message recipient. This protocol can also protect end-to-end routing privacy.
Our security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks. The theoretical analysis and
simulation show that the proposed scheme is eﬃcient and can provide high message delivery ratio. The proposed protocol can
be used for critical infrastructure protection and secure file sharing in mobile ad hoc networks where dynamic groups can be
formed.
1. Introduction
The decentralized nature of mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) makes rapid deployment of independent mobile
users practical. MANETs are suitable for many applications,
such as establishing survivable, dynamic communication
for emergency/rescue operations, disaster relief eﬀorts, and
military networks. MANETs consist of autonomous col-
lection of mobile users that communicate over bandwidth
constrained wireless links. All these issues make security,
jamming protection, and even node capture significant
concerns. Without privacy protection, adversaries can easily
learn the identities of the communication parties and the
relevant information that two users are communicating. For
example, the adversaries can track your on-line orders, the
web sites that you access, the doctors that you visit and many
more. Adversaries can also easily overhear all the messages,
passively eavesdrop on communications and perform traﬃc
analysis, routing monitoring, and denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks.
For a tactical military communication networks, com-
munication privacy is becoming an essential security require-
ment. As an example, an abrupt change in traﬃc pattern
or volume may indicate some forthcoming activities. The
exposure of such information could be extremely dangerous
in that adversaries can easily identify critical network nodes
and then launch direct DoS attacks on them. Communica-
tion privacy is also an indispensable security requirement for
applications such as e-voting, e-cash and so on.
In the past two decades, originated largely from Chaum’s
mixnet [1] and DC-net [2], a number of privacy-preserving
communication protocols have been proposed, including
for example, onion routing [3], K-anonymous message
transmission [4], Web MIXes [5], Mixminion [6], Mixing
email [7], Mixmaster Protocol [8], Crowds [9], and Buses
seat allocation [10], to name a few. The mixnet family
protocols use a set of “mix” servers that mix the received
packets to make the communication parties (including the
sender and the recipient) ambiguous. They rely on the
statistical properties of background traﬃc that is also referred
to as cover traﬃc to achieve the desired source privacy.
The DC-net family protocols [2, 4, 11, 12] on the other
hand, utilize secure multiparty computation techniques.
They provide provable source privacy without relying on
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trusted third parties. However, to broadcast a message, each
party of the group that the message sender hides, called the
ambiguity set (AS), needs to choose a random position. Even
if all parties are honest, there are no eﬀective noninteractive
means that can enable players to select distinct message
positions. This means that multiple parties may transmit
messages in the same slot. This is called the transmission
collision problem. There is no existing practical solution to
solve this problem [12].
As the computing, communicating, and cryptographic
techniques progress rapidly, increasing emphasis has been
placed on developing new eﬃcient and secure anonymous
communication schemes and network protocols without
relying on trusted third parties and free of collision.
In this paper, we first propose a novel unconditionally
secure source anonymous message authentication scheme
(SAMAS). While providing source privacy, the proposed
scheme can also provide message content authenticity with-
out relying on any trusted third parties. We then propose a
novel communication protocol for MANET that can ensure
communication privacy for both communication parties and
their end-to-end communications. The proposed network
protocol can be used for critical information distribution,
infrastructure protection, and secure file sharing. Our secu-
rity analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol is
secure against various attacks. The theoretical analysis and
simulation results show that the proposed scheme is eﬃcient
and can ensure high message delivery ratio.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the terminology, assumptions, and previous related
works are briefly reviewed. The proposed unconditionally
secure source anonymous message authentication scheme
(SAMAS) and security analysis are described in Section 3.
In Section 4, we propose an anonymous communication
protocol in detail along with security analysis and simulation
results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this
paper.
2. Terminology and Preliminary
In this section, we will briefly describe the terminology that
will be used in this paper. Then we will introduce some
cryptographic tools that will be used in this paper. Finally,
we will present a brief overview of the related works in this
area.
2.1. Terminology. Privacy is sometimes referred to as
anonymity. Communication anonymity in information
management has been discussed in a number of previous
works [1, 2, 9, 13–15]. It generally refers to the state of being
not identifiable within a set of subjects. This set is called the
ambiguity set (AS). Three types of anonymity were defined
[13]: sender anonymity, recipient anonymity, and relation-
ship anonymity. Sender anonymity means that a particular
message is not linkable to any sender and no message if
linkable to a particular sender. Recipient anonymity similarly
means that a message cannot be linked to any recipient
and that no message is linkable to a recipient. Relationship
Table 1: Notation.
AS or S Ambiguity set
SAMAS source anonymous message authentication code
MACi ith message authentication code
MES modified ElGamal signature
PPT probabilistic polynomial time
p a large prime number
Zp integer field module p
g a primitive element in Zp
xi private key of the ith user
yi public key of the ith user for SAMAC generation
ri ith signature component
s ElGamal signature component
m Message
n number of users in the AS
Ai ith member in the AS
h hash function
hi hash value h(m, ri)
pki(m) encrypt m using public key yi
ski Ai’s secret key for symmetric encryption
ski(m) encrypt m using secret key ski
Ni ith nonce
mFi ith message flag
rFi ith recipient flag
‖ message concatenation
M(i, j) message to send from node i to node j
S(m) SAMAC of message m
anonymity means that the sender and the recipient are
unlinkable. In other words, sender and recipient cannot be
identified as communicating with each other, though it may
be clear they are participating in some communications.
Relationship anonymity is a weaker property than that
of sender anonymity and recipient anonymity. The above
anonymities are also referred to as the full anonymities, since
they guarantee that an adversary cannot infer anything about
the sender, the recipient, or the communication relationship
from a transmitted message.
We will start with the definition of unconditionally
secure source anonymous message authentication scheme
(SAMAS).
Definition 1 (SAMAS). An SAMAS consists of the following
two algorithms:
(i) generate (m, y1, y2, . . . , yn): Given a message m and
the public keys y1, y2, . . . , yn of the ambiguity set
(AS) S = {A1,A2, . . . ,An}, the actual message sender
At, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, produces an anonymous message S(m)
using her own private key xt;
(ii) verify S(m): Given a message m and an anonymous
message S(m), which includes the public keys of all
members in the AS, a verifier can determine whether
S(m) is generated by a member in the AS.
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The security requirements for SAMAS include
(i) Sender ambiguity: The probability that a verifier
successfully determines the real sender of the anony-
mous message is exactly 1/n, where n is the total
number of AS;
(ii) Unforgeability: An anonymous message scheme is
unforgeable if no adversary, given the public keys of
all members of the AS and the anonymous messages
m1,m2, . . . ,ml adaptively chosen by the adversary,
can produce in polynomial time a new valid anony-
mous message with nonnegligible probability.
In this paper, the user ID and user public key will be used
interchangeably without making any distinguish.
2.2. Modified ElGamal Signature Scheme (MES).
Definition 2 (MES). The modified ElGamal signature
scheme [16] consists of the following three algorithms:
(i) Key generation algorithm: Let p be a large prime, g
be a generator of Z∗p . Both p and g are made public.
For a random private key x ∈ Zp, the public key y is
computed from y = gx mod p;
(ii) Signature algorithm: The MES can also have many
variants [17, 18]. For the purpose of eﬃciency, we will
describe the variant, called optimal scheme. To sign a
message m, one chooses a random k ∈ Z∗p−1, then
computes the exponentiation r = gk mod p and
solves s from
s = rxh(m, r) + k mod (p − 1), (1)
where h is a one-way hash function. The signature of message
m is defined as the pair (r, s);
(iii) Verification algorithm: The verifier checks the signa-
ture equation gs = r yrh(m,r) mod p. If the equality
holds true, then the verifier accepts the signature and
re jects otherwise.
2.3. Previous Work. The existing anonymous communica-
tion protocols are largely stemmed from either mixnet [1]
or DC-net [2]. A mixnet provides anonymity via packet
reshuﬄing through (at least one trusted) “mix”. In a
mixnet, a sender encrypts an outgoing message and the
ID of the recipient using the public key of the mix. The
mix accumulates a batch of encrypted messages, decrypts
and reorders these messages, and forwards them to the
recipients. An eavesdropper cannot link a decrypted output
message with any particular (encrypted) input message. The
mixnet thus protects the secrecy of users’ communication
relationships. Recently, Mo¨ler presented a secure public-key
encryption algorithm for mixnet [19]. This algorithm has
been adopted by Mixminion [6]. However, since mixnet-
like protocols rely on the statistical properties of background
traﬃc, they cannot provide provable anonymity.
DC-net [2, 15] is an anonymous multiparty computation
amongst a set of participants, some pairs of which share
secret keys. DC-net provides perfect (information theoretic)
sender anonymity without requiring trusted servers. In a
DC-net, users send encrypted broadcasts to the entire group,
thus achieving receiver anonymity. However, all members
of the group are made aware of when a message is sent,
so DC-net does not have the same level of sender-receiver
anonymity. Also, in DC-net, only one user can send at a time,
so it takes additional bandwidth to handle collisions and
contention. Lastly, a DC-net participant fixes its anonymity
versus bandwidth trade oﬀ when joining the system, and
there are no provisions to rescale that trade oﬀ when others
join the system.
Crowds [9] extends the idea of anonymizer and is
designed for anonymous web browsing. However, Crowds
only provides sender anonymity. It does not hide the
receivers and the packet content from the nodes en route.
Hordes [20] builds on the Crowds. It uses multicast services
and provides only sender anonymity.
Recently, message sender anonymity based on ring
signatures was introduced [21]. This approach can enable
message sender to generate source anonymous message
signature with content authenticity assurance, while hiding
the real identity of the message sender. The major idea is
that the message sender (say Alice) randomly selects n of
ring members as the AS on her own without awareness
of these members. To generate a ring signature, for each
member in the ring other than the actual sender (Alice),
Alice randomly selects an input and computes the one-way
output using message signature forgery. For the trapdoor
one-way function corresponding to the actual sender Alice,
she needs to solve the “message” that can “glue” the ring
together, and then signs this “message” using her knowledge
of the trap-door information. The original scheme has very
limited flexibility and the complexity of the scheme is quite
high. Moreover, the original paper only focuses on the
cryptographic algorithm, the relevant network issues were
totally left unaddressed.
In this paper, we first propose an unconditionally secure
and eﬃcient source anonymous message authentication
scheme based on the modified ElGamal signature scheme.
This is because the original ElGamal signature scheme is
existentially forgeable with a generic message attack [22,
23]. While the modified ElGamal signature (MES) scheme
is secure against no-message attack and adaptive chosen-
message attack in the random oracle model [24].
2.4. Threat Model and Assumptions. We assume the par-
ticipating MANET nodes voluntarily cooperate with each
other to provide the service. All nodes are potential message
originators of anonymous communications. The adversaries
can collaborate to passively monitor and eavesdrop every
MANET traﬃc. In addition, they may compromise any
node in the target network to become an internal adversary,
which could be the internal perpetrators. In this paper,
we assume that passive adversaries can only compromise a
fraction of the nodes. We also assume that the adversaries are
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computationally bounded so that inverting and reading of
encrypted messages are infeasible. Otherwise, it is believed
that there is no workable cryptographic solution.
An agent of the adversary at a compromised node
observes and collects all the information in the message, and
thus reports the immediate predecessor and successor node
for each message traversing the compromised node. Assume
also that the adversary collects this information from all the
compromised nodes, and uses it to derive the identity of the
sender of a message. The sender has no information about
the number or identity of nodes being compromised. The
adversary collects all the information from the agents on the
compromised nodes, and attempts to derive the true identity
of the sender.
3. Unconditionally Secure Source Anonymous
Message Authentication Scheme (SAMAS)
In this section, we propose an unconditionally secure and
eﬃcient source anonymous message authentication scheme
(SAMAS). The main idea is that for each message m to be
released, the message sender, or the sending node, generates
a source anonymous message authentication for the message
m. The generation is based on the MES scheme. Unlike ring
signatures, which requires to compute a forgery signature
for each member in the AS separately, our scheme only
requires three steps to generate the entire SAMAS, and link
all nonsenders and the message sender to the SAMAS alike.
In addition, our design enables the SAMAS to be verified
through a single equation without individually verifying the
signatures.
3.1. The Proposed SAMAS Scheme. Suppose that the message
sender (say Alice) wishes to transmit a message m anony-
mously from her network node to any other node. The
AS includes n members, A1,A2, . . . ,An, for example, S =
{A1,A2, . . . ,An}, where the actual message sender Alice is At,
for some value t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Let p be a large prime number and g be a primitive
element of Z∗p . Then g is also a generator of Z∗p . That is
Z∗p = 〈g〉. Both p and g are made public and shared by all
members in S. Each Ai ∈ S has a public key yi = gxi mod p,
where xi is a randomly selected private key from Z∗p−1. In this
paper, we will not distinguish between the node Ai and its
public key yi. Therefore, we also have S = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}.
Supposem is a message to be transmitted. The private key
of the message sender Alice is xt, 1 ≤ t ≤ n. To generate an
eﬃcient SAMAS for message m, Alice performs the following
three steps:
(1) Select a random and pairwise diﬀerent ki for each 1 ≤
i ≤ n, i /= t and compute ri = gki mod p;
(2) Choose a random k ∈ Zp and compute rt =
gk
∏
i /= t y
−rihi
i mod p such that rt /= 1 and rt /= ri for
any i /= t, where hi = h(m, ri);
(3) Compute s = k +∑i /= t ki + xtrtht mod (p − 1).
The SAMAS of the message m is defined as
S(m) = (m, S, r1, . . . , rn, s), (2)
where gs = r1 · · · rnyr1h11 · · · yrnhnn mod p, and hi = h(m, ri).
3.2. Verification of SAMAS. A verifier can verify an alleged
SAMAS (m, S, r1, . . . , rn, s) for message m by verifying
whether the following equation
gs = r1 · · · rn yr1h11 · · · yrnhnn mod p (3)
holds. If (3) holds true, the verifier Accepts the SAMAS
as valid for message m. Otherwise the verifier Rejects the
SAMAS.
In fact, if the SAMAS has been correctly generated, then
we have
r1 · · · rn yr1h11 · · · yrnhnn mod p
= gk1 · · · gkn yr1h11 · · · yrnhnn mod p
= g
∑

















i /= t ki+xtrtht mod p
= gs mod p.
(4)
Therefore, the verifier should always Accept the SAMAS if it
is correctly generated without being modified.
Remark 1. As a trade-oﬀ between computation and trans-
mission, the SAMAS can also be defined as S(m) =
(m, S, r1, . . . , rn,h1, . . . ,hn, s). In case S is also clear, it can be
eliminated from the SAMAS.
3.3. Security Analysis. In this subsection, we will prove that
the proposed SAMAS scheme is unconditionally anonymous
and provably unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message
attack.
3.3.1. Anonymity. In order to prove that the proposed
SAMAS is unconditionally anonymous, we have to prove that
(i) for anybody other than the members of S, the probability
to successfully identify the real sender is 1/n, and (ii) anybody
from S can generate SAMAS.
Theorem 1. The proposed source anonymous message authen-
tication scheme (SAMAS) can provide unconditional message
sender anonymity.
Proof. The identity of the message sender is unconditionally
protected with the proposed SAMAC scheme. This is because
that regardless of the sender’s identity, there are exactly
(p − 1)(p − 2) · · · (p − n) diﬀerent options to generate the
SAMAC, and all of them can be chosen by the SAMAC gen-
eration procedure and by any of the members in the AS with
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 5
equal probability without depending on any complexity-
theoretic assumptions. The proof for the second part, that
anybody from S can generate the SAMAC is straightforward.
This finishes the proof of this theorem.
3.3.2. Unforgeability. The design of the proposed SAMAS
relies on the ElGamal signature scheme. Signature schemes
can achieve diﬀerent levels of security. Security against
existential forgery under adaptive-chosen message attack is
the maximum level of security.
In this section, we will prove that the proposed SAMAS
is secure against existential forgery under adaptive-chosen
message attacks in the random oracle model [25]. The
security of our result is based on the well-known dis-
crete logarithms problem (DLP), which assumes that the
computation of discrete logarithm in Zp for large p is
computationally infeasible. In other words, no eﬃcient
algorithms are known for non-quantum computers.
We will introduce two lemmas first. Lemma 2, or the
Splitting Lemma, is a well-known probabilistic lemma from
reference [24]. The basic idea of the Splitting Lemma is that
when a subset Z is “large” in a product space X × Y , it will
have many “large” sections. Lemma 3 is a slight modification
of the Forking Lemma presented in [24]. The proof of this
theorem is mainly probability theory related. We will skip the
proof of these two lemmas here.
Lemma 2 (The Splitting Lemma). Let Z ⊂ X × Y such that
Pr[(x, y) ∈ Z] ≥ ε. For any α < ε, define W = {(x, y) ∈
X ×Y | Pry′∈Y [(x, y′) ∈ Z] ≥ ε−α}, andW = (X ×Y)\W ,
then the following statements hold
(1) Pr[W] ≥ α;
(2) ∀(x, y) ∈W ,Pry′∈Y [(x, y′) ∈ Z] ≥ ε − α;
(3) Pr[WZ] ≥ α/ε.
Lemma 3 (The Forking Lemma). Let A be a Probabilistic
Polynomial Time (PPT) Turing machine. Given only the
public data as input, if A can find, with nonnegligible prob-
ability, a valid SAMAS (m, S, r1, . . . , rn,h1, . . . ,hn, s) within
a bounded polynomial time T , then with nonnegligible
probability, a replay of this machine which has control over
A and a diﬀerent oracle, outputs another valid SAMAS
(m, S, r1, . . . , rn,h′1, . . . ,h′n, s), such that hi = h′i , for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n, i /= j for some fixed j.
Theorem 4. The proposed SAMAS is secure against adaptive
chosen-message attack in the random oracle model.
Proof. (Sketch) If an adversary can forgery a valid SAMAS
with nonnegligible probability, then according to the Forking
Lemma, the adversary can get two valid SAMACs
(m, S, r1, . . . , rn,h1, . . . ,hn, s),
(





such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i /= j,hi = h′i , and hj /=h′j . That is
gs = r1 · · · rn yr1h11 · · · yrnhnn mod p, (6)
gs
′ = r1 · · · rn yr1h
′
1
1 · · · yrnh
′
n
n mod p. (7)
Divide equations (6) and (7), we obtain
gs−s
′ = yrt(ht−h′t )t mod p. (8)
Equivalently, we have
yt = gs−s′/rt(ht−h′t ) mod p. (9)
Therefore, we can compute the discrete logarithm of yt
in base g with nonnegligible probability, which contradicts
to the assumption that it is computationally infeasible to
compute the discrete logarithm of yj in base g. Therefore,
it is computationally infeasible for any adversary to forge a
valid SAMAC.
4. The Proposed Privacy-Preserving
Communication Protocol
4.1. Network Model. Keeping confidential who sends which
messages, in a world where any physical transmission can
be monitored and traced to its origin, seems impossible.
To solve this problem, in this paper, we consider networks
with multiple MANETs. That is, the participating nodes are
divided into a set of small subgroups. We classify the network
nodes into two categories, normal nodes and super nodes.
A normal node is a network node that may not be able
to communicate direct with the nodes in other MANETs.
A super node can be a normal node that can also provide
message forward services to other MANET nodes. It can also
be a special node dedicated to providing message forward
services to other MANET nodes. For energy optimization,
the normal nodes can take turn to be the super nodes
(Figure 1).
Prior to network deployment, there should be an admin-
istrator. The administrator is responsible for selection of
security parameters and a group-wise master key sG ∈ Z∗p .
The group master key should be well safeguarded from
unauthorized access and never be disclosed to the ordinary
group members. The administrator then chooses a collision-
resistant cryptographic hash function h, mapping arbitrary
inputs to fixed-length outputs on Zp, for example, SHA-1
[26].
The administrator assigns each super node a suﬃciently
large set of collision-free pseudonyms that can be used
to substitute the real IDs in communications to defend
against passive attacks. If a super node uses one pseudonym
continuously for some time, it will not help to defend against
possible attacks since the pseudonym can be analyzed in the
same way as its real ID. To solve this problem, each node
should use dynamic pseudonyms instead. This requires each
super node to sign up with the administrator, who will assign
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Network A
Network B Network C
Super node
Normal node
Figure 1: An illustration of network topology of the proposed
scheme.









In addition, each super node will also be assigned a
corresponding secret set: SA = {gsGh(idA1 ), . . . , gsGh(idAτ )}.
4.2. Anonymous Local MANET Communication. To realize
anonymous network layer communications, obviously there
should be no explicit information (such as the message
sender and recipient addresses) in the message content.
All of the information related to addresses, including the
destination MANET where the recipient resides, should be
embedded into the anonymizing message payload.
Prior to network deployment, the administrator needs
to select a set of security parameters for the entire system,
including a large prime p and a generator g of Z∗p . The
network nodes A1,A2, . . . ,An and the corresponding public
keys y1, y2, . . . , yn of the n participating network nodes,
where xi ∈ Zp, is a randomly selected private key of node
Ai, and yi is computed from yi = gxi mod p.
A normal node only communicates to other nodes in
the same MANET. The communication between two normal
nodes in diﬀerent MANETs has to be forwarded through the
supper nodes in the respected local MANETs. Each message
contains a nonce (N), a message flag (mF), a recipient flag
(rF), and a secret key. The nonce is a random number that
is used only once to prevent message replay attack. The
recipient flag enables the recipient to know whether he is
the targeted receiver or a forwarding node. The secret key
is used to encrypt the message payload through symmetric
encryption algorithm.
More specifically, for a node Ai to transmit a message m
anonymously to a node Aj in the same MANET, through the
nodes Ai+1, . . . ,Aj−1, where j > i+1, node Ai generates a new













i + 1, j
)









j − 1, j)
= pkj
(




where for l = i + 1, . . . , j,Nl is a nonce, mFl is a message flag,
rFl is a recipient flag, skl is the secret key used for one time
message encryption, and ‖ stands for message concatenation.
When the node Ai+1 receives the message packet, the
node decrypts the first block of the received message using
its private key corresponding to yi+1. After that, the node will
get the recipient flag and message flag with the instruction
for the subsequent actions.
When a message reaches the targeted recipient, to ensure
traﬃc balance, the node will generate a dummy message to
its subsequent nodes. Only the super nodes can terminate
or initiate a dummy message. In this way, the amount of
traﬃc flow that a node creates as the initiator is concealed
in the traﬃc that it forwards since the overall traﬃc that
it receives is the same as the traﬃc that it forwards. In
addition, the message is encrypted with the private key that
only the recipient can recover. While the intermediate nodes
can only view the instruction of the message allowed. The
sender’s message is indistinguishable by other nodes. The
sender and the recipient are thus hidden amongst the other
nodes. It is infeasible for the adversary to correlate messages
using traﬃc analysis and timing analysis due to message
encryption. Therefore, perfect obscure of its own messages
can be assured. Detailed security analysis will be presented
later.
Remark 2. When the message is delivered to the recipient’s
local MANET, if the super node is close enough to the
recipient node, then the super node can simply broadcast
the message. In this case, the message format in (11) can be
adjusted accordingly.
4.3. Dynamic Local MANET Formation. Due to node mobil-
ity in the MANET, the local MANET will dynamically
change over time. This makes reforming of the local MANET
an essential part of our proposed scheme. The dynamic
updating of the MANET can be characterized through
mobility of each individual node, that can leave and join a
local MANET.
4.3.1. Process for a Node to Join a Local MANET. When a
node, say node Aj , wishes to join a local MANET, it needs
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 7









where yj is the public key of node Aj , and T is a timestamp.
After receiving this request message, the super node has to
determine the relative location of this node according to
the direction and strength of the request signal provided by
nodes that also received this message. The super node will
determine where the node should be located in the local
MANET logically. Then the super node will broadcast a
message in the following format to inform the local MANET
that node yj will be joining the local MANET in between










where T is a timestamp.
4.3.2. Process for a Node to Leave a Local MANET. A node
can leave a local MANET either positively or passively. For
positive leaving, the node, say node Aj , is aware that it is
leaving the local MANET. It will send a request message to








where yj is the public key of node Aj , and T is a timestamp.
For passive leaving, the node will just leave the local MANET
without informing anyone. The super node will discover
a node’s leaving through message transmission failure and
Hello message detection.
When a super node is aware of a node’s leaving through
either of the two manners, it will inform all of the local








which means a node with public key yj has left the local
MANET, and it should be removed from the local MANET.
4.4. Anonymous Communications between Two Arbitrary
Super Nodes. In the previous subsections, we present the
mechanism that allows two arbitrary nodes to communicate
anonymously within the same MANET. This includes com-
munications between two super nodes in the same MANET.
For any two arbitrary super nodes in diﬀerent MANETs
to communicate anonymously, we will first introduce the
concept of anonymous authentication or secret handshake
by Balfanz et al. [27]. Anonymous authentication allows two
nodes in the same group to authenticate each other secretly in
the sense that each party reveals its group membership to the
other party only if the other party is also a group member.
Nonmembers are not able to recognize group members.
The scheme consists of a set of super nodes and an
administrator who creates groups and enrolls super nodes
in groups. For this purpose, the administrator will assign
each super node A a set of pseudonyms idA1 , . . . , id
A
τ , where
τ is a large security parameter. In addition, the administrator
also calculates a corresponding secret set {gsGh(idA1 ) mod
p, . . . , gsGh(id
A
τ ) mod p} for super node A, where sG is the
group’s secret and h is a hash function. The pseudonyms will
be dynamically selected and used to substitute the real IDs
for each communication. This means that two super nodes A
and B can know each other’s group membership only if they
belong to the same group.
When the super node A wants to authenticate to the
super node B, the following secret handshake can be
conducted:
(1) A → B: Super node A randomly selects an unused
pseudonym idAi and a random nonce N1, then sends
idAi ,N1 to super node B;
(2) B → A: Super node B randomly selects an unused
pseudonym idBi and a random nonce N2, then sends
idBj ,N2,V0 = h(KBA‖idAi ‖idBj ‖N1‖N2‖0) to super
node A, where KBA = gsGh(id
A
i )·h(idBj ) mod p;
(3) A → B: Super node A sends V1 =
h(KAB‖idAi ‖idBj ‖N1‖N2‖1) to super node B, where
KAB = gsGh(id
B
j )·h(idAi ) mod p.
Since KBA = KAB, A can verify V0 by checking
whether V0
?= h(KAB‖idAi ‖idBj ‖N1‖N2‖0). If the verification
succeeds, then A knows that B is an authentic group
peer. Similarly, B can verify A by checking whether V1
?=
h(KBA‖idAi ‖idBj ‖N1‖N2‖1). If the verification succeeds, then
B knows that A is also an authentic group peer. However, in
this authentication process, neither super node A, nor super
node B can get the real identity of the other node. In other
words, the real identities of super node A and super node B
remain anonymous after the authentication process.
4.5. Anonymous Communication between Two Arbitrary Nor-
mal Nodes. As mentioned before, there should be no explicit
exposure about the addresses of the message sender and
recipient. To transmit a message, the sender first randomly
selects a local super node and transmits the message to
the super node according to the mechanism described
before. On receiving the message, the local super node first
determines the destination MANET ID by checking the
message recipient flag rF, either 0 or 1. If it is 0, then
the recipient and the super node are in the same MANET.
The message can be forwarded in the recipient node using
the previously described mechanism. If rF is 1, then the
recipient is in a diﬀerent MANET, The super node forwards
the message to a super node in the destination MANET
as described in the previous subsection. Finally, when the
super node in the recipient’s local MANET receives the
message, the communication again becomes local MANET
communications. The message can now be transmitted in the
same way that the sender and the recipient are in the same
MANET.
While providing message recipient anonymity, the mes-
sage can also be encrypted so that only the message
recipient can decrypt the message. The proposed anonymous
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communication is quite general and can be used in a variety
of situations for communication anonymity in MANET,
including anonymous file sharing.
4.6. Security Analysis. In this subsection, we will analyze
anonymity, impersonation attack, and replay attack of the
proposed anonymous communication protocol.
4.6.1. Anonymity. We will first prove that the proposed com-
munication protocol can provide both message sender and
recipient anonymity in the local MANET communications.
Theorem 5. It is computationally infeasible for an adversary to
identify the message sender and recipient in the local MANET.
Therefore, the proposed anonymous communication protocol
provides both sender and recipient anonymity in the local
MANET.
Proof. (Sketch) First, since the number of message packages
that each node receives from its immediate predecessor is
the same as the number of packets that it forwards to its
immediate successor, so the adversaries cannot determine the
message source based on the traﬃc volume or the number
of message packets. Second, since the message packages are
encrypted using either the public keys or the shared secret
keys of the intermediate nodes. No adversary is able to
distinguish the real meaningful message from the dummy
message in the transmission in any of the network nodes
due to the traﬃc balance property and message content
encryption. Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish the
initiator traﬃc from the indirection traﬃc and learn whether
the node is a recipient, a receiver, or simply a node that
provides message forward service. Consequently, both the
message sender and recipient information is anonymous for
the adversary attack.
For any two normal nodes in diﬀerent MANETs to
communicate anonymously, the communication can be
broken into three segments: the communication between the
sender and a local super node in the message sender’s local
MANET, the communication between two super nodes in the
corresponding MANETs, and the communication between
the recipient super node and the recipient. Theorem 5 has
assured the communication anonymity between a super
node and a normal node in the local MANETs. Therefore,
we only need to ensure anonymity between two super nodes
in diﬀerent MANETs in order to achieve full anonymity
between the sender and recipient.
We already described before that each super node is being
assigned a large set of pseudonyms. A dynamically selected
pseudonym will be used for each communication. The
pseudonyms do not carry the user information implicitly.
Therefore, the adversary cannot get any information of
the super nodes from the network. This result can be
summarized into the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The proposed communication protocol can pro-
vide both message sender and recipient anonymity between any
two super nodes.
Corollary 7. The proposed anonymous communication proto-
col can provide full anonymity for any sender and recipient in
the MANETs.
4.6.2. Impersonation Attacks. For an adversary elected to
perform impersonation attack to a normal node, he needs
to be able to conduct forgery attack. We already proved in
Theorem 4 that this is infeasible. Therefore, we only need
to consider whether it is feasible for an adversary to forge a
super node.
For an adversary to impersonate as a super node, he
needs to be able to authenticate himself with a super node A.
This requires the adversary A to compute gsGid
A·idAi mod p,
where idA is the identity of the adversary and idAi is the
ith pseudonym of the super node A. However, since the
adversary does not know the master secret sG, he is unable
to compute gsGh(id
A)·h(idAi ) mod p and impersonate as a super
node. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8. It is computationally infeasible for a PPT adver-
sary A to impersonate as a super node.
Like all other network communication protocols, in our
proposed protocol, an adversary may choose to drop some
of the messages. However, if the immediate predecessor and
the successor nodes are honest and willing to cooperate, then
the messages being dropped, and the substitution of the valid
messages with the dummy messages can be eﬀectively tracked
using the provided message flags.
An adversary that is elected as a super node may refuse
to forward messages across the MANETs and thus block
the anonymous communications between the sender and
the receiver. This attack can be hard to detect if the sender
does not have the capability to monitor all network traﬃc.
However, the sender can randomly select the super nodes for
each data transmission. If the nonce is properly generated,
when a packet is lost, the recipient should be able to know.
4.6.3. Message Replay Attacks. The message replay attack
occurs when an adversary can intercept the communication
packet, correlate the message to the corresponding sender
and recipient, and retransmit it. We have the following
theorem.
Theorem 9. It is computationally infeasible for an adversary
to successfully modify/reply an (honest) node’s message.
Proof (Sketch). According to (11), each message package in
communication has a unique one-time session ID (nonce)
to protect the message package from being modified or
replayed. In addition, these fields are encrypted using the
intermediate receiver nodes’ public key so that only the
designated receiver nodes can decrypt the message. In
this way, each packet transmitted across diﬀerent MANETs
bears diﬀerent and uncorrelated IDs and content for PPT
adversaries. Therefore, it is computationally infeasible for the
adversary to modify or replay any messages in the MANET.
This includes the case that even if the same message is being
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Figure 2: Simulation results of the proposed secure routing scheme.
transmitted multiple times, the adversary still cannot link
them together without knowing all the private keys of the
intermediate nodes.
5. Performance Analysis and Simulation Results
In this section, we will provide simulation results of our
proposed protocol on energy consumption, communication
delay, and message delivery ratio. For energy consumption,
we provide simulations for both the normal nodes and the
super nodes. For wireless communications, due to collision
and packet drop, it is very challenging to assure high
messages delivered ratio. However, our simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed protocol can achieve high
message delivery ratio (Figure 2).
Our simulation was performed using ns-2 on Linux
system. In the simulation, the target area is a square field
of size 2000 × 2000 meters. There are 64 rings located in
this area. The number of the nodes on each ring, that is, the
ring length, is set to be from 7 to 16 in our simulation. The
message generation interval is set to be four diﬀerent values:
60 seconds, 90 seconds, 120 seconds, and 150 seconds in our
simulation for comparison. The messages transmitted in the
network are 512 bytes long.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we first propose a novel and eﬃcient source
anonymous message authentication scheme (SAMAS) that
can be applied to any messages. While ensuring message
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sender privacy, SAMAS can also provide message content
authenticity. To provide provable communication privacy
without suﬀering from transmission collusion problem, we
then propose a novel privacy-preserving communication
protocol for MANETs that can provide both message sender
and recipient privacy protection. Security analysis shows that
the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks. Our
performance analysis and simulation results both demon-
strate that the proposed protocol is eﬃcient and practical. It
can be applied for secure routing protection and file sharing.
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